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Neuroimaging? A Perspective on the
Meaning and Application of Mental
Disorder Terms, in Particular Major
Depressive Disorder
Stephan Schleim*
Theory and History of Psychology, Heymans Institute for Psychological Research, Faculty of Behavioural and Social
Sciences, University of Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands
Increasing research efforts try to identify biological markers in order to support or
eventually replace current practices of diagnosing mental disorders. Inasmuch as these
disorders refer to subjective mental states, such efforts amount to their objectification.
This gives rise to conceptual as well as empirical challenges: What kind of things are
mental disorders? And how to deal with situations where subjective reports, clinical
decisions, and brain scans contradict each other? The present paper starts out with
a discussion of recent efforts to objectify beauty. Such attempts to quantify and
localize psychological constructs in the brain are compared to earlier examples from the
history of psychology. The paper then discusses personal and social implications of the
objectification of subjective mental states, including mental disorders. The construct of
Major Depressive Disorder, one of the most prevalent mental disorders, is then analyzed
in more detail. It turns out that this is a very complex construct probably associated with
highly heterogeneous actual instances of the disorder. It is then shown that it is unlikely
to replace these symptoms’ descriptions with patterns of brain activations, at least in the
near future, given these patterns’ empirical lack of specificity. The paper then discusses
which of the disorder’s core symptoms are more or less amenable to behavioral or
neuroscientific investigation and analyses whether the heterophenomenological method
can solve the problem. The conclusion is that the disorder construct is neither entirely
subjective, nor completely objectifiable, and that clinical experts do well by continuing
to take a pragmatical stance.
Keywords: biomarkers, brain reading, fMRI, reverse inference, psychological constructs, neuroethics, neuro-
realism, neuroaesthetics
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INTRODUCTION
“And I think it’s a very important point to get across that for
the first time in human history subjective mental states – [he
repeats emphatically]: subjective mental states! – which belong
in our private world, can actually not only be localized, but
can be quantified.” Professor Semir Zeki (in a TEDx talk at the
University College London, 2012).1
Zeki (1999) summarizes his research on the neuroscience of
beauty, sometimes called neuroaesthetics, in this presentation.
His statement that he can now define beauty in terms of a
neural response in a particular brain area within the orbito-
medial (meaning: close to the eye sockets and in the middle of
the two hemispheres) prefrontal cortex deserves a philosophical
analysis of its own. For the present paper, I instead draw the
reader’s attention to Zeki’s claim that he and his collaborators
managed to localize and quantify subjective mental states for the
first time in human history. What he means is that a number
of subjects (N = 21) were found to have stronger activity in a
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment in
the said brain area while briefly looking at pictures or listening
to short music clips. These had previously been identified as
beautiful in contrast to ugly stimuli of the same modalities (Ishizu
and Zeki, 2011).
Leaving aside some influential schools in the history of
psychology such as the behaviorism advocated by Watson (1913)
or Skinner (1977), schools which denied that private entities
like mental states could or should be a subject matter of
scientific research, most of this discipline is arguably dealing
with subjective mental states or processes. Whether we are
talking about perceptions, thoughts, prejudices, biases, beliefs,
desires, or emotions, psychologists and more recently cognitive
scientists and neuroscientists have conceived of numerous
ways to operationalize (meaning: define in such a way that
it can be investigated in an experiment) these psychological
entities. This allowed them to investigate their relations to
stimuli, behavior, and other such entities. To emphasize
that these entities are defined or constructed by humans,
I will broadly call them “psychological constructs” in what
follows.
From this historical and theoretical perspective, the claim
that somebody quantified psychological constructs for the first
time in human history in 2012 is surprising. Imagine that
somebody would measure the intensity of her or his back
pain on a scale from 1 to 10 throughout the course of a day;
that person would have quantified the subjective experience of
pain. Whether that operationalization of somebody’s pain is
valid (does it measure what it is supposed to measure?) and
reliable (does it yield similar results under similar conditions?)
is another issue, that may just as well be raised for Zeki’s
operationalization of beauty. Nevertheless, the quantification of
psychological constructs has been an important methodological
choice since the earliest days of that discipline. Think, for
example, of Hermann Ebbinghaus’s research on the learning
1https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NlzanAw0RP4, published on July 2, 2012
(accessed January 11, 2018).
curve for memorizing syllables (Ebbinghaus, 1885) or Wilhelm
Wundt’s investigation of the relation between the strength
of a stimulus and the intensity of its perception (Wundt,
1893).
When Semir Zeki refers to the localization of a subjective
mental state, he means that methods such as fMRI identify
statistically significant changes of brain activation in a Cartesian
space, that is, small physiological changes that can be assigned
x-, y-, and z-coordinates. Psychologists who investigated
electrodermal activity to quantify psychological processes usually
did not believe that these processes were localized in parts
of the skin (Landis, 1930). Yet, researchers used methods
like electroencephalography (EEG) as early as the 1930s to
look for activity changes in the brain (Berger, 1938/1939) and
brain imaging has a history that goes back into the 19th
century (Raichle, 2009). Therefore we can conclude that the
quantification and localization of psychological constructs is
neither new nor exceptional in everyday scientific practice.
This analysis of Zeki’s claim nevertheless allowed us to
briefly summarize what researchers in these disciplines are
doing and how they are doing it. I will demonstrate in
the remainder of this paper why it is still important to
discuss efforts to quantify and localize subjective mental
states.
WHAT’S AT STAKE
The meaning of beauty was at stake in the example discussed
above. Zeki claims that if there were no brain activation
corresponding to beauty, then this concept would be
meaningless. This way of making sense of brain scans has
been documented frequently in neuroscience communication
and has been called “neuro-realism” by Racine et al. (2010).
If a psychological construct cannot be associated with an
identifiable brain response, the argument goes, then it cannot
really exist. One might perhaps call this kind of thinking “reverse
eliminativism,” for instead of claiming that neuroscience will
eventually show at least some psychological constructs to be
superfluous, such as the propositional attitudes (like thinking,
believing, or desiring that; Churchland, 1981), the implication
is that a psychological construct can only be said to exist if a
corresponding brain pattern has been found. According to that
logics, Zeki thus saved “beauty” by relating it to – or actually
identifying it with – activation in the brain (Ishizu and Zeki,
2011).
This is arguably a question of primary interest for esthetics.
However, the same train of thought applies to examples of much
broader relevance related to the application of neurotechnology,
particularly brain scanning or neuroimaging devices like fMRI.
Ultimately, people’s mental autonomy is at stake; or put
differently: Who is to decide about the presence or absence
of a psychological construct when a person’s self-perception
and judgment contradicts that of a psychologist, cognitive
scientist, or neuroscientist?2 In examples like lie detection
2This question is related to the common distinction between the first- and the
third-person-perspective on the mind often made in philosophy. As this paper
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 May 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 702
fpsyg-09-00702 May 9, 2018 Time: 15:51 # 3
Schleim Meaning Major Depressive Disorder
(Greely and Illes, 2007; Metzinger, 2009) or the detection
of consciousness in a person putatively in a vegetative state
(Fins, 2016), the relevance of making inferences about people’s
subjective mental states is obvious. In the former case, a person’s
employment or freedom may depend on the results if he
or she is subjected to a safety screening procedure or legal
prosecution; in the latter case, treatment decisions or even
the continuation of life-prolonging means might depend on
the results. In a similar fashion, I have described the theory,
practice, and implications of reframing empathy as well as
psychopathy and its therapy on the basis of neuroimaging
(Schleim, 2015).
As these examples have been already discussed in the
literature, I shall here analyze another case of comparable
relevance that has received much attention in empirical
research recently: I am referring to the identification of
biological markers, or simply “biomarkers,” to diagnose Major
Depressive Disorder (MDD; Figure 1), one of the most prevalent
mental disorders. With respect to such a diagnosis, much
can be at stake, because a diagnosis of MDD in response
to somebody’s psychological problems can not only affect
the identity of that person, but also treatment decisions,
the availability of insurances and loans, and carries the risk
of stigmatization and social exclusion (O’Connor and Joffe,
2013).
THE CASE OF MAJOR DEPRESSIVE
DISORDER
When speaking about MDD, the advantages of using the
notion of a “psychological construct” become apparent: This
disorder entity is something constructed by experts, a definition
made by working groups of institutional bodies like psychiatric
associations (Dehue, 2008; Zachar and Kendler, 2012; Frances,
2013; Kendler, 2016; Schleim, 2018). It is important to emphasize
that this does not mean that the problems subsumed under
the term are any less real, problems that can and actually do
frequently have a severe impact on somebody’s well-being as
well as personal and occupational relations. Calling it a construct
also takes into account that its definition changes in the course
of time, for example, from Griesinger’s (1845) “melancholia”
to Kraepelin’s (1899) “manic depression” (German: manisch-
depressives Irresein), pioneers of scientific psychiatry, to the
present definition in the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistics Manual of the American Psychiatric Association,
called DSM-5 (Dehue, 2008; American Psychiatric Association
[APA], 2013; Frances, 2013; Schleim, 2018). According to
that manual, MDD is a condition where at least five of
the following nine symptoms are present, under which at
least one of the first two, for a period of at least 2 weeks:
(1) depressive mood; (2) diminished interest or pleasure in
activities; (3) significant weight loss or gain without dieting;
focuses rather on the empirical and ethical implications of ascribing mental
disorder constructs to people, I prefer to contrast patients’ subjective experience
with scientists’ expert statements, being aware that this could also be phrased as a
contrast of perspectives.
(4) too little or too much sleep; (5) too little or too
much movement; (6) fatigue or loss of energy; (7) feelings
of worthlessness or guilt; (8) diminished ability to think,
concentrate, or indecisiveness; and (9) recurrent thoughts of
death or a suicide attempt (American Psychiatric Association
[APA], 2013).3
So, what kind of thing is MDD? 227 variants can be
distinguished conceptually given the said symptoms and
conditions. In an extreme case, two persons with the same
diagnosis might only share one symptom (e.g., symptoms 1,
3, 4, 5, and 6 vs. 2, 6, 7, 8, and 9). Additionally, some
symptoms contain opposites, such as weight loss or gain, or
sleeping too much or too little, and can be expressed in more
or less intensity. MDD is thus a complex construct that might
have just as many faces – or one might say realizations or
instantiations – in the real world as there are people getting
the diagnosis (Wardenaar and de Jonge, 2013; de Jonge et al.,
2015; Patten, 2015). Considering that its annual prevalence is
estimated to be 7% (Wittchen et al., 2011), actually using more
conservative criteria than those of the DSM-5, we are talking
about at least 525 million instances worldwide of MDD every
year.
The many challenges of defining mental disorder constructs
have been discussed elsewhere (Kendler et al., 2011; Frances,
2013; Stier, 2013; Frisch, 2016). Given the normative,
institutional, and even financial interests involved (Barbui,
2015), it is understandable that many psychiatrists hoped that
genetic and neuroimaging research might yield biomarkers
(Figure 1). These would be akin to the natural or essentialist
kinds4 concept discussed in philosophy and might allow to
distinguish, diagnose, and treat mental disorders (Kupfer et al.,
2002; Hyman, 2007; Kendler et al., 2011). However, already
the conceptual complexity of MDD that we just addressed
makes it theoretically very unlikely to find biomarkers which
reliably co-occur with instantiations of that condition. And
this is indeed the empirical situation for all mental disorders
so far: Out of the 150–600 disorders of the DSM-5, depending
on how one counts, and in spite of great research efforts of
the last decades, not a single one can be diagnosed reliably
with a biomarker (American Psychiatric Association [APA],
2013; Frisch, 2016). There remains of course a theoretical
possibility that research methods of the future or a breakthrough
in data analysis will change that situation (Schleim, 2015).
However, leaving aside the essential normativity (because
experts draw a boundary between normal states and a disorder)
and historical plasticity (which version of a definition should
3Note that this is a brief and superficial summary of several pages of the DSM-
5. Also note that “symptom counting” is not the same as a clinical diagnosis;
for the latter, it must also be assessed how much someone is suffering and how
much impaired her or his life is. It is a decision a clinical expert has to take on an
individual basis.
4A classical example is the periodic table of elements used in chemistry and physics.
Something is iron (symbol Fe from Latin ferrum) if and only if it has 26 protons
in its atomic nucleus. The number of protons, also called the atomic number, is
the essence of iron and the other elements. In this case, the classification system is
shaped by the organization of nature itself. The problems and limitations of such an
approach in psychiatry have been discussed earlier (Kendler et al., 2011; Kendler,
2016).
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FIGURE 1 | Annual publications show an exponential increase for both topics, biomarkers for mental disorders (blue line) and fMRI research on Major Depressive
Disorder (red line). This documents a strongly increasing scientific interest and relevance of the topic of this article. Source: Topic searches on the ISI Web of Science
(www.webofknowledge.com) using biomarker∗ AND “mental disorder∗” and “major depressive disorder” AND fMRI, respectively.
be accepted?) of these psychological constructs, the present
conundrum reminds us that much of science consists in
matching language to observations in the world (Janich, 2009;
Anderson, 2015).
Now one might argue that here lies the promise of
neuroscience, to objectify and validate the construct of MDD,
just like Zeki claimed that he quantified and localized beauty.
But ever since psychologists started to use physiological methods
to investigate the functions of the mind, they noticed a lack
of specificity, that is, the fact that a certain physiological signal
or process can be associated with numerous psychological
states or processes (Landis, 1930; Cacioppo and Tassinary,
1990). This has more recently been discussed as the “reverse
inference” problem with respect to fMRI and other neuroimaging
methods (Poldrack, 2006; Schleim and Roiser, 2009). It cannot
be ruled out that it will someday be possible to unambiguously
identify psychological constructs in patterns of the nervous
system (Friston et al., 2017). Yet, one would expect from
a pragmatical point of view that this works first for simple
psychological constructs like basic emotions or processes of
decision-making before applying it to the complex construct
of MDD and other mental disorders. But even for the better
understood and clearer defined constructs and even for so-
called “brain reading” algorithms, such identifications remain
essentially probabilistic (Haynes and Rees, 2006; Poldrack, 2006,
2010; Anderson et al., 2013). This means that attempts to
use neuroimaging to diagnose MDD – now and in the near
future – will at best make the presence of that condition
a bit more likely; and this implies that there will be cases
where a brain might look like that of a person with a proper
MDD diagnosis but where clinicians would not make the
diagnosis as well as the opposite cases where a person with
a proper MDD diagnosis does not show the expected brain
activation (Figure 2). How could we decide such ambiguous
situations?
ASK THE HETEROPHENOMENOLOGIST
When talking about MDD, it is thus far not clear whose
decision should settle the case whether a person is diagnosed
properly or not. The person her- or himself might deny
suffering from psychological problems or might perhaps fake
them. Obviously, a clinical expert has the social function and
power to make such a diagnosis, following norms, guidelines,
and rules for that act, particularly criteria as they are defined
in handbooks like the DSM. As written above, these are
not only subject to change, but also in the eye of the
beholder to at least some extent, as when judging whether a
person’s suffering or social-occupational dysfunction is clinically
significant. Neuroimaging, we have seen, cannot replace the
clinical expert’s diagnosis so far, as there are no reliable
biomarkers.
Daniel Dennett proposed the method of heterophenomenology
to face a similar challenge, namely to scientifically test
people’s accounts of their subjective experience (Dennett, 1991,
2007). He criticized phenomenology for yielding accounts
that are, first, to be taken at face value, and, second,
often contradictory; for example, think of people’s reports of
what it is like to be in love. The heterophenomenologist
would listen to such descriptions neutrally, without making
any ontological statement about whether they correspond to
reality or not. This question has to be settled by further
scientific investigation. What could this look like for MDD?
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FIGURE 2 | To explain a mismatch between subjective ratings and brain scanning results, I use real data from the study on sexual orientation by Safron et al. (2017).
Of course, this by no means suggests that any such orientation is a mental disorder; that case has been settled a long time ago (Zachar and Kendler, 2012). On the
left (A) you can see the results for male subjects’ own ratings of how much they liked erotic pictures featuring men or women: the higher the score, the more they
preferred the former over the latter. Subjects had been split into a hetero-, bi-, and homosexual group according to a questionnaire on sexual preferences. Note that
there is no overlap between the heterosexual and homosexual groups. On the right (B) you can see the corresponding data from the ventral striatum, a brain area
frequently associated with erotic experiences. Note that while these data resemble the results from the subjects’ own ratings, there is now some overlap between
the heterosexual and homosexual groups; in particular, there is one outlier on top of the “heterosexual” column who identified himself as heterosexual (questionnaire)
and stated that he liked female erotic pictures more than those of men (ratings shown in (A)), but whose brain activation falls right into the middle of that of the
homosexual group. If we ascribed psychological constructs on the basis of such measurements, this example illustrates substantial implications for people’s mental
autonomy and personal identity. License: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Let’s take a closer look at the nine symptoms described
above:
The first two, depressive mood and diminished interest or
pleasure in activities, do have a subjective component, like
feeling bad or less pleasure; the same holds for feelings of
worthlessness or guilt and recurrent thoughts of death. One
could of course ask people, but they might not give an honest
answer, perhaps because they feel ashamed or are afraid of being
excluded. However, these symptoms also have an observable
side, inasmuch as we would not expect somebody with them
to cheerfully engage in many social activities or to excessively
make plans for the future. Weight, sleep, and movement are
clearly observable and it depends on the point of comparison
to decide whether they are too much or too little. Fatigue
or loss of energy should be measurable in a similar way and
suicide attempts obviously so. The diminished ability to think,
concentrate, or indecisiveness should also be observable to some
extent, as such a person should ponder very long about what
he or she should do and not be able to complete cognitively
demanding tasks. Summarized, while the construct of MDD in
its present version is not completely objectifiable, it is also not
absolutely subjective either. That is, it is amenable to a plausibility
or coherence test, given more observations of a person’s life in the
past (think about records or other people’s accounts), present, and
future.
Interestingly, Dennett’s ultimate test is very much the same
as Zeki’s and that of the neuro-realist we encountered above,
for he concluded his thoughts on heterophenomenology writing:
“Then the question of whether items thus portrayed exist as
real objects, events, and states in the brain [. . .] is an empirical
matter to investigate. If suitable real candidates are uncovered,
we can identify them as the long-sought referents of the subject’s
terms” (1991: 98). We have already seen above that this is not
possible for MDD, at least for the time being. This incapability
led some researchers to question the validity of the construct
(Holtzheimer and Mayberg, 2011), or, more generally, the proper
foundation of psychological constructs (Anderson, 2015). When
one is looking for the meaning of “beauty” or a theory of
consciousness, one can, in principle, wait indefinitely. MDD can
be such a severe condition, though, that hundreds of millions of
people every year cannot wait until the case is eventually settled
scientifically.
CONCLUSION
We have seen that MDD is a complex and highly variable
construct, which is neither completely referring to subjective
experience nor completely to behaviors or other observable states.
Furthermore, the nine symptoms are unlikely to be replaced by
brain states or processes in the near future. Given the statistical
nature and variability of neuroimaging methods (Schleim and
Roiser, 2009), it is questionable whether that would even be
possible: Imagine a person in whose brain a clear biomarker
of MDD would be found, but who could engage in her or his
everyday activities without any impairment. This would rather
falsify the validity of the biomarker than prove that that person
is suffering from MDD. Therefore, the construct – and probably
many if not all other mental disorder constructs as well –
essentially refers to how people feel, how much they suffer, and
what they can and cannot do in their lives. The ultimate test of the
heterophenomenologist or neuro-realist thus does not only seem
unnecessary, but actually confused. This argument can be made
even stronger by taking the normative and institutional aspects
of defining mental disorder constructs into account as well (Stier,
2013; Barbui, 2015).
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That the symptoms of MDD cannot be replaced by
neuroscientific categories and that their boundaries are
vague does not make the diagnosis arbitrary, though. As
we have seen, there are ways to test the validity of its
application. What this shows is that clinical experts are
probably right in taking a pragmatical stance (Kendler
et al., 2011), instead of worrying about unanswered
theoretical and empirical questions. Ideally, though, such
knowledge could help to improve the construct in the
future.
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